The short answer
In the first six weeks of a restructuring the finance function has to establish three things, in this order: transparency over liquidity, clarity on the legal position, and a defensible set of numbers for the conversations with banks and shareholders. Everything else – the measures plan, the cost programme, the negotiating strategy – builds on that and is worthless without it.
The mistake that costs most is the reverse order: discussing measures first and calculating afterwards. Walking into a lender meeting with unsupported figures and having to correct them at the next one destroys the thing the whole restructuring rests on – credibility.
Week 1: liquidity on the table
The first step is always the same, whatever the sector or size: a 13-week liquidity forecast, built directly from cash flows, week by week, using realistic payment behaviour rather than contractual payment terms.
Four schedules belong to it, and experience says none of them is ever complete when a crisis starts:
- Open receivables by due date, with an honest view of what will actually come in.
- Open payables by due date – including the invoices not yet entered in the ledger.
- Non-discretionary payments: social security contributions, wage tax, VAT, debt amortisation, insurance, rent. They fall due regardless of the situation and are the most common source of unpleasant surprises.
- Credit lines and collateral: what is committed, what is drawn, what is pledged for what, and which covenants bite when.
Social security contributions deserve a sentence of their own. Withholding the employee portion is a criminal offence in Germany under section 266a of the Criminal Code and attaches to the directors personally. In any payment prioritisation this item therefore sits in a different place from a supplier invoice.
Week 2: establish the legal position
In parallel – not afterwards – the question of where the company stands legally has to be answered. Three states must be distinguished, and the duty to file for insolvency hangs on them:
| State | Meaning | Consequence |
|---|---|---|
| Imminent illiquidity (section 18 InsO) | Forecast over usually 24 months | No duty – but access to the StaRUG |
| Illiquidity (section 17 InsO) | Liabilities then due cannot be serviced | File within three weeks |
| Over-indebtedness (section 19 InsO) | Balance-sheet over-indebtedness and a negative going-concern prognosis | File within six weeks |
The classification is not for the finance function to make alone – it belongs in a conversation with a law firm specialising in insolvency law. What finance supplies is the arithmetic: a liquidity status for section 17 InsO, and a documented twelve-month going-concern prognosis as soon as balance-sheet over-indebtedness is in play. The detail is in our article on the deadlines that trigger the duty to file.
Weeks 3 and 4: the numbers you negotiate with
Now the material that will be negotiated over comes into being. Banks and shareholders expect four components almost without exception:
- The rolling 13-week forecast with plan-versus-actual variances for the preceding weeks. The variance analysis matters more than the forecast: it shows whether the numbers can be trusted.
- An integrated plan over twelve to 24 months, connecting profit and loss, balance sheet and liquidity.
- The root cause analysis. Why did the situation arise – volume, margin, working capital, one-off effects, financing structure? Without a clean derivation, any measures plan looks arbitrary.
- A measures plan with a cash effect. Per measure: effect in euros, timing of the effect, cost to implement, owner. Measures without a date are worthless in a crisis, because the date is precisely what matters.
Weeks 5 and 6: the lender conversation
Three things are worth observing when approaching lenders in a crisis.
Early rather than late. A bank that learns of a deterioration from the reporting it has been sent reacts differently from one that was told in advance. The timing of that information is the one factor entirely within management's control.
Complete rather than flattering. A figure that has to be corrected at the second meeting costs more trust than the original bad news would have. Uncertainties belong on the table, not hidden.
With a proposal rather than a request. “We need more time” is not a negotiating position. “We need amortisation suspended in the amount of X until 31 March; in return we will implement the following measures, and this is what liquidity looks like afterwards” is one.
If the bank asks for a restructuring opinion under IDW S 6 – the German professional standard for restructuring concepts – that is not a vote of no confidence but its own protection against clawback and liability risk. The better the underlying numbers are prepared, the shorter and cheaper the exercise becomes.
The five mistakes that sink more restructurings than the business does
- Starting too late. The StaRUG is only open while nothing worse than imminent illiquidity exists. Wait until cash is tight and you lose the instrument with the widest room for manoeuvre.
- Optimistic planning. A liquidity forecast that turns out to have been too positive costs more trust in a crisis than a bad number would. Plan cautiously and surprise on the upside.
- Communication by accident. Banks, shareholders, trade credit insurers, key suppliers and staff need coordinated messages and a timetable. Contradictory statements from inside your own house are a frequent and entirely avoidable form of damage.
- Costs only, no cash. Headcount reductions hit the profit and loss account quickly but liquidity late – severance and notice periods cost money first. Working capital works the other way round: fast on cash, barely visible in earnings. In a crisis the cash effect comes first.
- No documentation. Who decided what, when and on what basis is what settles the liability question afterwards. That record is created during the restructuring or not at all.
Why the role is often filled from outside
Restructuring is one of the five typical triggers for an interim CFO mandate, and the reasons have less to do with technical skill than with the constellation.
The incumbent finance leadership is part of the story that now has to be explained – which complicates the conversation with lenders regardless of how good their work has been. The additional load is substantial and lasts six to twelve months, then stops. And the task calls for experience of a process you ideally go through rarely: anyone handling a restructuring for the first time is learning it under the worst possible conditions.
Day rates in this segment sit above the market average – from around EUR 3,000 for interim CFO mandates in restructuring and group environments, against EUR 1,400 to 2,500 in the ordinary case. The context is on our pricing page.
Frequently asked questions
What does a CFO do first in a restructuring?
Establish transparency over liquidity: a 13-week forecast built from cash flows, open items by due date, the non-discretionary payments and the status of credit lines. Without that basis you can neither assess the legal position nor negotiate with lenders.
How long does a restructuring take in the finance function?
The intensive phase typically runs six to twelve months. The first six weeks decide the starting position; the first quarter decides your credibility with the financing parties.
When should you talk to the bank?
Before the bank notices for itself. A deterioration communicated in advance and with a proposed course of action is a conversation; the same deterioration discovered in submitted reporting is a trust problem – and trust is the currency this phase is paid in.
Do we need a restructuring opinion?
Whenever lenders are being asked to decide on an extension, a standstill or new money. The IDW S 6 opinion is their protection against clawback and liability risk, and it demonstrates restructuring capability in three stages: ability to continue, to compete and to earn a return.
What does an interim CFO cost in a restructuring?
Well above the market average of around EUR 1,317 a day. Restructuring and group mandates start at roughly EUR 3,000 a day, because responsibility for results, time pressure and proximity to personal liability push the rate up.
Does this apply to a German subsidiary of a foreign group?
Yes, and the German specifics matter most there. The filing duties and deadlines attach to the German entity's directors personally, and the social security rule applies regardless of where the parent sits. Group treasury arrangements that work elsewhere – cash pooling, upstream loans, letters of comfort – need to be reviewed against those duties before, not after, liquidity gets tight.
Read on
- Insolvency filing deadlines in Germany – three and six weeks, twelve and 24 months, in context.
- 13-week liquidity forecast – structure, method and the four mistakes.
- Restructuring opinion under IDW S 6 – content, stages and preparation.
- Interim CFO references – twelve mandates, among them a restructuring with exit preparation.
- Interim management for the finance function – ready to start within 24 hours.
Sources and status
Legal framing: sections 15a, 17, 18, 19 InsO, section 266a of the German Criminal Code, sections 1 and 29 StaRUG; restructuring concepts under IDW S 6 in its 2023 version. Day rate figures: DDIM market study 2026 and the ranges in our own pricing overview. The remaining statements are based on nugrow's mandate practice. As of September 2026. This article is an overview and not legal or tax advice.
